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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DELILA BELL SLOAN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43280
BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2014-6895
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Delila Bell Sloan pled guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. She received a unified
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and the district court retained
jurisdiction. Following her rider, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. On appeal,
Ms. Sloan contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s
discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. She further contends that the
district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its jurisdiction, and in failing to reduce
her sentence or place her on probation in light of the additional information submitted in
conjunction with her Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On May 20, 2014, Delila Bell Sloan went to Burger King.

(Presentence

Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.5-6.) She was there with Johnny Ricks and
her son. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Restaurant employees contacted law enforcement due to the
erratic behaviors of Ms. Sloan and Mr. Ricks. (PSI, p.4.) Law enforcement stopped the
vehicle Ms. Sloan was observed leaving the restaurant in, and Ms. Sloan admitted to
possessing and selling methamphetamine.

(PSI, pp.4-5.)

Ms. Sloan had

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in her purse. (PSI, p.4.) Based on these
facts, Ms. Sloan was charged by information with one count of possession of a
controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver.2 (R.,3 pp.52-53.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Sloan pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. (R., p.76.) As part of the plea agreement, the
State agreed to recommend that, with acceptance into a problem solving court,
Ms. Sloan would be placed on probation. (7/30/14 Tr., p.4, L.23 – p.5, L.11; 10/29/14
Tr., p.4, L.20 – p.5, L.6; R., pp.57-60.) The district court accepted the plea and ordered
a Presentence Investigation.

(7/30/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.16-17.) The matter was set for

sentencing. (7/30/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.7-8.) Ms. Sloan was conditionally accepted into the

Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped
with the electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendum to the PSI,
Substance Abuse Evaluation, and Mental Health Evaluation.
2 Ms. Sloan was also charged with misdemeanor injury to a child and possession of
drug paraphernalia in Bonneville County case number CR 2014-6867. (PSI, p.10.)
3 The specific page numbers identified by Ms. Sloan in her Appellant’s Brief correspond
to the actual pages of the electronic clerk’s record. The clerk’s record on appeal does
not comport with I.A.R. 28(f), which requires the numbering to include every page in the
record even if it was not a filed document.
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drug court program, conditioned upon successful completion of a retained jurisdiction
program. (R., p.69.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Sloan to a unified sentence of seven years, with
three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for up to 365 days.4 (10/29/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.524; R., pp.76-77.)

After five months on the rider, the district court relinquished

jurisdiction over Ms. Sloan without a hearing. (R., p.78.)
Ms. Sloan then filed a timely Rule 35 Motion seeking a reduction of her sentence.
(R., pp.79-80.)

At the hearing on Ms. Sloan’s Rule 35 motion, Ms. Sloan’s counsel

asked the district court to reconsider its order relinquishing jurisdiction or to reduce the
determinate portion of Ms. Sloan’s sentence. (5/6/15 Tr., p.15, L.3 – p.16, L.14; R.,
p.83.) The district court denied Ms. Sloan’s Rule 35 motion after a hearing. (R., p.84.)
Ms. Sloan filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.85-88.) Ms. Sloan appeals from the
order relinquishing jurisdiction and the district court’s order denying her I.C.R. 35
motion.
ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Ms. Sloan to seven years,
with three years fixed, upon her conviction for one count of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Ms. Sloan?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Sloan’s Rule 35
Motion in light of the new information provided in support thereof?

Due to State’s discovery of additional criminal convictions in another state and
Ms. Sloan’s failure to contact the presentence investigator, the State deemed itself no
longer bound by the terms of the plea agreement and recommended a retained
jurisdiction. (10/29/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.14-24; R., p.66.)
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Sloan To Seven Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Possession Of
Methamphetamine With Intent To Deliver
Ms. Sloan asserts that, given any view of the facts, her sentence of seven years,
with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an
independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Sloan does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Ms. Sloan must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence
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based on Nice’s lack of prior record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper
consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing the
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). Ms. Sloan began
using methamphetamine when she was 12 years old. (PSI, pp.12, 15.) However,
Ms. Sloan both needs and wants substance abuse treatment. (10/29/14 Tr., p.6, Ls.620; PSI, pp.15, 16, 43.) While Ms. Sloan was provisionally accepted into drug court,
jurisdiction was relinquished so she never had the opportunity to participate. (R., pp.69,
78.)

Prior to the rider program, Ms. Sloan had not attended any substance abuse

treatment as an adult. (PSI, p.15.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires
the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Ms. Sloan suffers from schizophrenia, PTSD, and
bipolar disorder; however, at the time of the incident, she was not on medication to treat
these mental health conditions. (7/30/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.8-22; PSI, pp.14-15, 40.)
Another fact that should have been considered more fully by the district court is
the fact that Ms. Sloan accepted responsibility for her conduct and expressed remorse
for her acts. (7/30/14 Tr., p.5, L.17 – p.13, L.11.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency
is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts
responsibility for his acts.

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v.

Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court
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of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed
“remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept
treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209. In
Shideler, Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his
poor mental and physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and
drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it
outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon,
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.

Shideler, 103 Idaho at

594-95. Therefore, the court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an indeterminate term
not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at
593. Ms. Sloan’s circumstances are somewhat similar to the facts of both Alberts and
Shideler in that she recognizes that she has an addiction to methamphetamine and
heroin, she wants treatment for her substance abuse, she has been diagnosed with
mental health conditions, and she took responsibility for her actions.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Sloan asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that
had the district court properly considered her mental health conditions, controlled
substance addiction, and acceptance of responsibility, it would have imposed a less
severe sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Ms. Sloan
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.
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State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). “The decision to place a defendant on probation or
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion.”

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App.

2010). Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original
judgment. Id. at 289.
Ms. Sloan contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction in light of her limited successes during her period of retained jurisdiction, her
recognition of a problem, and her desire to make the changes necessary so that this
type of incident does not happen again.
The district court failed to recognize that Ms. Sloan was making progress while
on the retained jurisdiction, and her progress would equate to a successful probation.
Ms. Sloan was participating in her programming and had expressed a willingness to
change her criminal thinking and behavior. (Addendum to the PSI (hereinafter, “APSI”),
p.3.) She had completed three out of four classes prior to relinquishment. (APSI, p.2.)
Ms. Sloan was able to identify the effects of her crime on herself and the community.
(APSI, p.7.) She also provided a commitment to change herself and to change her
behaviors. (APSI, p.7.) Ms. Sloan also demonstrated willingness to take accountability
for her actions. (APSI, p.7.) Although Ms. Sloan did receive disciplinary sanctions,5 she

Ms. Sloan engaged in bartering; this behavior resulted in her placement on a
behavioral contract and receipt of a Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR). (APSI, pp.910.) Ms. Sloan also received DORs for sleeping in past 5:00 a.m., and for breaking her
behavioral contract. (APSI, p.2.)
5
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was making self-improvements—she expressed an understanding of what she needed
to do in order to stay sober. (APSI, p.3.)
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Ms. Sloan’s significant rehabilitative potential, the district court
abused its discretion when relinquished its jurisdiction over her.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Sloan’s Rule 35 Motion In
Light Of The New Information Provided In Support Thereof
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.

State v. Trent,

125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. “When presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
The new information presented in support of Ms. Sloan’s Rule 35 motion showed
that the classes she took had improved her skill set such that Ms. Sloan would be better
able to succeed on probation. (5/6/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-24.) At sentencing, the district
court expressed concerns over Ms. Sloan’s lack of skills and/or sufficient supportive
network in the community that would permit her to complete the terms and conditions of
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probation. (5/6/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-10.) The programming Ms. Sloan had received since
her sentencing increased her skill set and respectively, her ability to be successful in the
community.

In light of Ms. Sloan’s progress, the district court should have either

reduced the fixed portion of her sentence or placed her on probation.
In light of the new information presented in support of her Rule 35 motion,
Ms. Sloan asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to reverse
its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and place her on probation or otherwise reduce the
fixed portion of her sentence.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Sloan respectfully requests that this Court place her back on probation or
reduce the fixed portion of her sentence.
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2016.
________/s/_________________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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